LIBRARY 

JF  THE 

' BHIXEBSITY  OF  ILLINOIS 


Railroad  Wrecks 


Paper  read  by  D.  F.  Jurgensen, 
President  of  the  Civil  Engineers’ 
Society  of  St.  Paul, 

AT  TH  E 

Seventeenth  Annual  Convention 

OF  THE 

Minnesota  Surveyors’  and  Engineers’  Society 
Held  at  Duluth,  Minnesota 
February  13  th,  1912 


/ 


1912 

SYNDICATE  PRINTING  CO. 
Minneapolis,  Minn. 


G&GmLS 


RAILROAD  WRECKS. 

Mr.  President , Members  and  Guests  of  the  Minnesota  Surveyors 

and  Engineers'  Society ; 

I am  highly  honored  at  being  privileged  to  meet  with  such  a 
distinguished  gathering  here  today.  Your  committee  waited  upon 
me  about  a month  ago,  and  asked  if  I would  prepare  a paper  on 
the  subject  of  “Railroad  Wrecks,”  to  be  read  at  this  meeting,  to 
which  request  I hesitatingly  consented. 

I do  not  know  why  the  committee  assigned  this  particular  sub- 
ject to  me,  unless  it  was  prompted  by  the  extreme  concern  caused 
to  both  the  public  and  the  railroad  companies  in  our  state,  as  well 
as  in  the  neighboring  states  during  the  past  two  months,  because 
of  the  numerous  serious  accidents  which  have  occurred,  and  in 
which  many  lives  were  lost. 

This  subject  is  a serious  and  important  one  to  discuss,  and  early 
relief  therefrom  must  be  secured  to  the  public,  which  is  demanding 
and  is  justly  entitled  to  a safer  service,  and  we,  as  engineers  and 
builders  of  railroads,  owe  it  to  the  community  at  large,  to  render 
^sjl  aid  possible  in  working  out  such  corrective  measures  as  will, 
if  not  entirely,  at  least  materially  reduce  the  number  of  such  acci- 
dents, and  their  attendant  casualties. 

I believe  that  the  number  of  railroad  accidents  can  be  largely 
decreased  without  interfering  with  the  present  manner  of  conduct- 
§ mg  the  service. 

One  would  naturally  gather  from  the  great  advancement  made 
during  the  past  twenty  years  in  the  construction  of  railroad  track 
and  bridge  details,  in  the  construction  of  locomotives  and  cars,  and 
in  the  development  of  safety  appliances  and  improved  signalling, 
that  the  number  of  train  accidents  with  their  attendant  loss  of  life, 
should,  with  all  these  modern  improvements,  be  materially  reduced; 
but  that  apparently  is  not  the  case. 

To  begin  with,  it  is  assumed  and  granted,  that  no  railroad  man- 
ager, officer  or  employe,  deliberately,  maliciously  or  wilfully  with 
; evil  intent,  conducts  his  enterprise,  or  performs  his  duty  with  a 
view  toward  the  destruction  or  maiming  of  human  life. 

The  railroad  manager  and  officer  is  without  doubt  as  properly 
concerned  in  accidents  and  wrecks  as  is  the  public,  because  the 
transportation  company  is  prima  facie  responsible,  and  often  is  com- 
pelled to  pay  very  dearly  for  the  resulting  casualties. 

3 

I i \ • ■ < . " ■ 4 


Wrecks  are  never  a good  advertisement  for  a carrier,  and  like 
any  other  business  enterprise  which  is  dependent  upon  the  confi- 
dence and  good  will  of  its  patrons  for  its  continued  existence  and 
success,  railroad  corporations  can  ill  afford  to  ignore  or  neglect  to 
employ  any  means,  device  or  agency  that  may  be  conducive  to  the 
safety  of  its  patrons. 

There  is  probably  no  industry  in  existence  that  is  so  absolutely 
dependent  upon  the  human  element  for  its  safe  operation,  as  is  a 
railway  system;  for  instance,  machines  have  been  invented  to  aid 
the  farmer  in  economically  performing  his  work,  by  reducing  the 
number  of  hands  that  otherwise  would  be  required,  but  the  mind 
of  man  has  not  yet  devised  a machine  that  will  dispatch  and  con- 
duct trains,  handle  tram  orders,  or  perform  such  other  duties  as 
now  fall  to  the  lot  of  a general  railroad  employe. 

In  this  connection,  it  can  safely  be  said,  without  fear  of  contra- 
diction, that  in  none  of  the  ordinary  walks  of  life  are  men  so  well 
compensated  for  the  services  rendered,  as  are,  generally  speaking, 
the  employes  of  the  American  railways;  their  work  is  steady,  their 
pay  is  certain,  and  their  hours  of  labor  and  rest  have  been  regu- 
lated by  legislation,  to  their  advantage. 

To  find  the  preventative  remedy  for  errors  in  railroad  operation 
and  railroad  wrecks,  the  seat  of  the  trouble,  or  the  cause,  must 
first  be  ascertained,  and  when  once  found,  a panacea  will  be  de- 
vised. We  may  here  ask,  “Is  the  subject  of  railroad  accidents  be- 
ing seriously  looked  into,  investigated  and  studied  with  a view  to- 
wards ascertaining  the  cause,  and  applying  the  proper  remedy;  if  so, 
by  whom,  and  with  what  success?” 

It  is  true  that  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  and  many 
of  the  state  commissions,  are  now  and  for  some  time  past  have  been 
actively  engaged  in  conducting  such  investigation.  The  federal 
law  under  which  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  is  conduct- 
ing this  work  is  entitled: 

“An  Act  requiring  common  carriers  engaged  in  interstate  and 
foreign  commerce  to  make  a full  report  of  all  accidents  to  the  In- 
terstate Commerce  Commission,  and  authorizing  investigations 
thereof  by  said  Commission.” 

Said  act  was  approved  May  6,  1910. 

It  provides  a penalty  on  failure  to  make  report  within  thirty 
(30)  days  after  the  end  of  any  month.  It  also  gives  the  Commis- 
sion power  to  investigate  accidents,  and  reads  in  part  as  follows: 

“The  Commission  or  any  impartial  investigator  thereunto  au- 
thorized by  said  Commission,  shall  have  authority  to  investigate 


such  collisions,  derailments  or  other  accidents  aforesaid,  and  for 
that  purpose  may  subpoena  witnesses,  administer  oaths,  take  testi- 
mony and  require  the  production  of  books,  papers,  orders,  memor- 
anda, exhibits  and  other  evidence,  and  shall  be  provided  by  said 
carriers  with  all  reasonable  facilities;  provided,  however,  that  when 
such  accident  is  investigated  by  a Commission  of  the  state  in  which 
it  occurred  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission  shall,  if  conven- 
ient, make  any  investigation  it  may  have  previously  determined 
upon  at  the  same  time  and  in  connection  with  the  said  State  Com 
mission  investigation. 

“Said  Commission  shall,  when  it  deems  it  to  the  public  inter 
est,  make  reports  of  such  investigations,  stating  the  cause  of  acci- 
dent, together  with  such  recommendations  as  it  deems  proper,  such 
reports  shall  be  made  public  in  such  manner  as  the  Commission 
deems  proper. 

“That  neither  said  report,  nor  any  report  of  said  investigation 
nor  any  part  thereof  shall  be  admitted  as  evidence,  or  used  for  that 
purpose,  in  any  suit,  or  action  for  damages,  growing  out  of  any 
matter  mentioned  in  said  report  or  investigation.” 

But  the  Interstate  Commerce  Commission,  by  said  act,  is  not 
given  any  power  or  authority  to  enforce  the  carrier's  compliance 
with  any  recommendatory  measures  intended  to  prevent  a recur- 
rence of  any  such  wreck,  accident  or  casualty , i.  e.,  the  said  federal 
law  goes  no  further  than  the  mere  matter  of  authorizing  investiga- 
tions, and  if  the  public  is  to  receive  any  relief  from  “ railroad 
wrecks ,”  it  must  seek  other  sources  than  the  federal  government , 
as  the  law  now  stands  in  this  respect. 

The  Minnesota  statute,  chapter  122,  Laws  1905,  gives  more 
power  to  the  State  Commission.  It  is: 

“AN  ACT  Requiring  Railroad  Companies  to  Report  all  Wrecks 
and  Casualties  Wherein  Any  Persons  are  Injured  or  Killed, 
to  the  Railroad  and  Warehouse  Commission. 

“Re  it  enacted  by  the  Legislature  of  the  State  of  Minnesota ; 

“Section  1 . It  shall  be  the  duty  of  every  railroad  company 
operating  a line  of  railroad  in  this  state,  to  report  all  accidents, 
wrecks  or  casualties  occurring  in  this  state,  to  the  Railroad  and 
Warehouse  Commission.  This  is  intended  to  include  all  accidents, 
wrecks  and  casualties  occurring  in  the  operation  of  trains  or  engines 
on  said  line  or  lines  of  railway  within  this  state,  and  all  other  acci- 
dents or  casualties  of  whatever  nature  as  may  be  required  under 
rules  adopted  by  the  Commission.  Any  reports  to  the  Commission 
herein  required  shall  not  be  for  public  inspection.  All  accidents 


5 


or  wrecks  occurring  in  the  operation  of  trains  or  engines,  involving 
loss  of  life  or  personal  injury,  shall  be  immediately  reported  to  the 
Commission  by  telegraph  or  telephone  message,  and  the  company 
shall  forthwith  send  a written  report  in  detail,  giving  full  particu- 
lars available  in  such  form  as  the  Commission  may  require.  All 
other  accidents,  including  accidents  resulting  in  personal  injury  or 
death,  other  than  train  accidents,  shall  be  reported  to  the  Commis- 
sion on  the  first  day  of  each  month  covering  the  preceding  month.” 

(As  amended  1907,  chapter  290.) 

‘‘Sec.  2.  Whenever  any  report  is  made  to  the  Commission 
involving  a wreck,  accident  or  casualty,  and  the  Commission  deems 
it  necessary,  it  shall  forthwith  examine  into  the  causes  and  circum- 
stances of  the  sam p and  it  shall  thereupon  he  the  duty  of  the  Com- 
mission to  order  such  railway  company  to  comply  with  any  reason- 
able requirements  prescribed  by  the  Commission  calculated  to  pre- 
vent the  recurrence  of  any  such  wrec\,  accident  or  casualty , and  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  report  to  the  legislature  bi- 
ennially a summarized  statement  of  all  wrecks,  accidents  or  casu- 
alties reported,  together  with  a recommendation  of  such  additional 
legislation  as  it  deems  proper  for  the  greater  protection  of  passen- 
gers and  employes  of  railroad  companies.”  (As  amended  1907, 
chapter  290.) 

‘‘Sec.  3.  Every  person  who  shall  violate  any  of  the  provisions 
of  this  act  shall  be  guilty  of  a misdemeanor  and  shall  be  punished 
by  a fine  of  not  less  than  one  hundred  ($100)  dollars , nor  more 
than  one  thousand  ($1,000)  dollars , or  imprisonment  in  the  county 
jail  for  not  less  than  thirty  (30)  days  nor  more  than  one  year , or 
shall  suffer  both  such  fine  and  imprisonment,  in  the  discretion  of  the 
court. 

‘‘Sec.  4.  This  act  shall  take  effect  and  be  in  force  from  and 
after  its  passage.”  ' 

(Approved  April  7,  1903.) 

You  will  observe  that  the  law  is  very  broad,  in  that  it  gives 
the  Commission  ample  power  to  go  as  far  as  is  necessary  to  obtain 
results  in  its  investigations.  Not  only  that,  the  Commission  is  also 
given  power  to  order  in  and  to  compel  the  carrier  to  comply  with 
any  reasonable  requirements  that  may  be  prescribed  and  calculated 
to  prevent  the  recurrence  of  such  a wreck,  accident  or  casualty.  It 
is  to  be  noted  in  this  particular  that  the  Minnesota  state  law  goes 
a step  further  than  the  federal  act. 

Since  the  passage  of  this  act,  the  Minnesota  Commission  has 
unceasingly  prosecuted  its  investigations  and  orders  embodying  cor- 


6 


rective  measures,  and  has  gathered  many  facts  which  are  going  io 
be  a valuable  aid  in  the  final  solution  of  the  wreck  problem.  For 
a practical  demonstration  let  us  see  the  accidents  that  occurred  in 
Minnesota  during  the  year  1911,  and  carry  them  through  the  dif- 
ferent stages  of  classification  to  a point  where  conclusions  may  be 
arrived  at. 

BROKEN  RAILS. 

But  before  proceeding,  I desire  at  this  time  to  say  just  a few 
words  on  the  subject  of  “ Broken  Rails.  ' 

The  public  has  of  late,  through  the  press,  and  other  sources, 
been  impressed  with  the  idea  that  “rail  failures ” are  one  of  the 
main  agents  of  railroad  disasters.  I do  not  want  to  be  understood 
here  as  championing  the  cause  of  the  steel  trust,  but  in  the  spirit 
of  honesty  and  fairness,  I believe  that  the  minds  of  the  public  should 
be  relieved  of  that  erroneous  impression,  because  in  my  judgment 
the  claim  is  not  borne  out  by  the  facts,  and  for  that  reason  should 
not,  in  justice  to  all  concerned,  be  allowed  to  stand  unchallenged. 

As  in  the  case  of  the  railroad  manager,  officer  and  employe,  let 
us  be  fair  in  our  dealings  with  the  rail  manufacturer,  and  not 
charge  him  with  having  evil  designs  on  the  lives  of  the  people  who 
are  obliged  to  patronize  the  carriers,  by  knowingly  and  wittingly 
manufacturing  rotten  rails. 

The  rail  manufacturer  has  been,  and  is  getting  a very  good 
price  for  his  product,  and  cannot  afford,  for  good  business  reasons, 
any  more  than  can  any  other  responsible  manufacturer,  to  turn  out 
of  his  mills  anything  but  the  best  product.  Besides  this  the  manu- 
facturer does  not  as  a rule  prescribe  the  specifications  under  which 
the  rails  are  to  be  made;  these  requirements  are  being  generally 
laid  down  by  the  carrier  or  the  buyer,  who  is  also  privileged  to,  and 
as  a rule  has  a representative  present  at  the  mills,  whose  duty  it  is 
to  see  to  it  that  the  rails  are  being  made  in  full  accordance  with 
the  contract.  This  inspector  is  given  free  entry  to  the  works  of 
the  manufacturer  and  is  afforded  every  reasonable  facility  to  satis- 
fy him  that  the  product  is  turned  out  as  called  for  by  the  specifica- 
tions. 

In  this  connection  there  is  probably  no  topic  associated  with  the 
subject  of  railroads  that  has  been,  or  is  at  the  present  time  being 
subjected  to  such  thorough  study,  experiment  and  research  as  are 
railroad  rails.  Several  eminent  bodies  composed  of  the  ablest 
engineers  and  metallurgists  in  this  country  have  been  for  some 
time  past,  and  are  still,  conducting  experiments  and  tests  with  a 


7 


view  toward  attainment  of  the  ideal  rail — and  their  efforts  have 
already  marked  considerable  progress  in  that  direction. 

The  Minnesota  Commission  in  considering  this  subject  has 
recommended  that  there  should  be  a system  of  goveinmental  in- 
spection of  the  construction  of  cars,  rails  and  all  structural  iron 
or  steel  work  used  by  railroads.  In  its  opinion,  the  increasing 
number  of  accidents  caused  by  broken  rails  and  switches,  and  the 
imperfect  condition  of  certain  portions  of  equipment  make  it  very 
apparent  that  the  interest  of  both  the  public  and  the  railway  com- 
pany will  be  best  subserved  by  having  such  inspection. 

I will  endeavor  to  demonstrate  in  a practical  way  to  what 
extent  broken  rails  are  the  cause  of  railroad  wrecks  and  in  so  doing 
will  first  refer  to  the  records  of  the  Interstate  Commerce  Com- 
mission, from  which  it  is  gathered . that  in  the  year  ending  June 
30,  1911,  there  occurred  in  the  entire  United  States  249  derail- 
ments, which  were  attributed  to  broken  rails , and  which  accidents 
resulted  in  the  death  of  twelve  persons , which  is  less  than  the  aver- 
age number  of  trespassers  killed  on  the  railways  of  the  United 
States  every  day  in  the  year. 

The  Minnesota  Railroad  and  Warehouse  Commission,  some 
two  years  ago,  interested  itself  in  instituting  a systematic  inquiry 
into  the  matter  of  broken  rails , and  to  this  end  required  all  the 
principal  railway  companies  operating  in  the  state  to  report  monthly 
on  forms  furnished  by  the  Commission , the  broken  rails  occurring  on 
is  lines. 

Broken  rails  directly  responsible  for  wrecks  have  been  brought 
to  the  office  of  the  Commission,  where  chemical  analyses  and  tests 
were  made  of  the  same.  The  Commission  is  still  prosecuting  these 
examinations,  with  the  result  that  a large  amount  of  valuable  data 
is  being  gathered  which  it  is  hoped  will  be  of  estimable  help  in  the 
final  solution  of  the  rail  question. 

To  give  an  idea  of  the  scope  of  the  Commission’s  investiga- 
tion, I will  quote  briefly  from  the  forms  used: 

“For  the  purpose  of  this  report,  a rail  should  be  considered 
broken  when  complete  fracture  into  two  or  more  parts  has  taken 
place,  or  when  there  is  any  break  in  the  head  of  the  rail  on  gauge 
side,  or  when  there  is  any  break  necessitating  either  immediate 
removal  of  rail  from  track  or  its  reinforcement.  In  cases  where 
broken  rails  have  been  the  direct  cause  of  accidents  a special  report 
on  Form  55  shall  immediately  be  forwarded  to  this  office , this  in 
addition  to  the  regular  monthly  report  covering  same  rail.” 

It  is  important  to  know  if  any  useful  conclusions  can  be  drawn 

8 


from  these  reports.  Let  us,  for  illustration,  take  the  report  of  Min- 
nesota for  the  year  ending  Oct.  31,  1911,  and  I believe  the  situa- 
tion in  this  state  is  typical  of  all  the  northern  states.  This  particu- 
lar year  is  being  used  because  the  data  has  not  been  compiled 
for  the  calendar  year  of  191  1.  It  is  found  that  on  the  principal  • 
railroads  in  Minnesota  during  the  year  ending  Oct.  31,  1911,  there 
were  ^954  broken  rails  reported.  The  months  of  December, 
January  and  February  are  credited  with  2,772  breakages,  or 
per  cent  of  the  total  for  the  year.  The  month  of  January  showed 
the  largest  number,  viz.,  1,643;  the  month  of  June  had  the  small- 
est number,  viz.,  52.  The  bulk  of  the  breakages  were  of  the  85 
and  90-pound  sections,  including  the  90-pound  Titanium,  and  most 
were  rolled  of  a late  date. 

Without  going  into  an  exhaustive  and  detailed  analysis  of  the 
state’s  investigations,  the  folowing  inferences  may  be  drawn  from 
its  examinations  in  this  connection: 

None  of  the  carriers  have  reported,  nor  do  they  claim,  that 
rails  have  broken,  or  are  breaking,  from  their  own  inherent  short- 
comings, nor  does  it  appear  plasusible  or  believable  that  rails  that 
have  safely  stood  shipment  from  the  mills,  handling  and  placing 
into  track  should  fail  from  their  own  innate  weakness. 

The  examinations  appear  to  disclose  that  breakages  occur  in 
rails  constituted  of  what  may  be  classed  both  good  and  poor  qual- 
ity metal.  The  failures  are  undoubtedly  largely  caused  by  unus- 
ual strains  which  are  induced  by  severe  and  abnormal  service 
conditions  to  which  rails  are  subjected,  in  which  may  be  included 
shocks  from  broken  or  flat  wheels,  defective  counterbalance,  wheels 
out  of  round,  defective  track,  improper  fastening  of  rails  upon 
ties,  and  other  like  circumstances,  which  would  tend  to  produce 
such  strains.  The  investigations  disclose  that  approximately  55 
per  cent  of  the  rails  broken  may  be  classified  as  being  of  good 
metal,  the  remaining  45  per  cent  of  the  failures  consisting  of  rails 
that  are  of  a poor  quality  metal. 

By  the  term  “poor  quality  metal’’  is  meant  rails  proving  them- 
selves defective  after  having  been  subjected  to  service,  and  cover 
such  defects  as  the  examination  indicates  as  segregation  of  consti- 
tuents, unsoundness,  brittleness,  faulty  rolling,  including  pipe,  old 
seam,  flow  of  metal,  split  head,  crushed  head,  split  web,  broken 
base,  and  other  shortcomings,  many  of  which  defects  it  would  be 
impossible  to  discover  at  the  mill. 

It  also  appears  from  a careful  analysis  of  this  subject  recently 
made  by  government  experts  that  transverse  fissures  develop  in  the 


9 


rail  section  after  a rail  has  been  laid  and  subjected  to  service,  a defect 
of  a most  dangerous  character,  because  it  cannot  be  detected  except 
by  chance.  This  defect  is  said  to  be  caused  by  heavy  wheel  press- 
ures, which  induce  internal  strain  in  the  steely  which  reaches  its 
greatest  intensity  on  the  gauge  side  of  the  head  of  the  rail,  where 
a flow  of  steel  takes  place  in  a lateral  direction. 

They  also  find  that  no  foreign  substance  in  the  steel  is  needed 
to  account  for  the  presence  of  these  fissures,  and  that  they  invari- 
ably occur  on  the  gauge  side  of  the  rail,  and  from  these  and  other 
facts  set  forth,  it  seems  that  these  fissures  are  not  defects  of  mill 
practice,  and  do  not  exist  in  a new  rail  before  it  is  laid. 

I desire  at  this  point  to  quote  briefly  from  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission’s  report  of  the  accident  on  the  line  of  the  Le 
high  Valley  road,  near  Manchester,  New  York,  Aug.  25,  1911, 
which  accident  was  caused  by  a broken  rail,  and  which  was  a 90- 
lb.  open  hearth  rail. 

“With  the  information  at  present  available,  it  is  extremely  dif- 
ficult to  suggest  any  preventative  of  future  accidents  of  this  charac- 
ter. From  such  information  as  is  at  hand,  however,  it  seems  appar- 
ent that  the  remedy  lies  in  the  diminishing  of  the  wheel  pressure 
and  the  lowering  of  direct  compressive  and  bending  stresses.  The 
report  of  our  expert  clearly  shows  that  exhaustive  experiments  and 
tests  should  be  begun,  and  that  a most  complete  and  searching  ex- 
amination should  be  made  of  the  whole  question. 

These  examinations  should  deal  with  steel  rails  from  the  fur- 
nace, and  the  time  they  are  laid  in  the  track;  it  should  determine 
whether  the  tests  now  used  in  the  steel  mills  are  adequate  to  detect 
imperfect  rails,  it  should  ascertain  whether  the  use  of  high  carbon 
steel  is  not  attended  with  dangers  not  recognized  in  the  drawing 
up  of  current  specifications;  it  should  be  extensive  enough  to  in- 
quire into  the  causes  which  contribute  towards  such  a destruction 
of  the  structural  integrity  of  the  steel  as  was  the  case  with  this 
rail;  it  should  take  up  the  securing  of  measurements  in  the  track 
of  the  actual  fiber  stresses  which  are  caused  by  the  new  types  and 
weights  of  locomotives,  and  under  different  wheels  of  these  loco- 
motives, in  order  to  obtain  information  from  which  to  judge  of  the 
severity  of  the  strains  to  which  the  track  is  daily  subjected;  in  fact, 
track  conditions  as  they  exist  at  the  present  time  should  be  dealt 
with  even  to  the  most  minute  detail.  It  also  appears  that  the  dan- 
ger zone  in  the  use  of  steel  rails  as  at  present  manufactured  has 
been  reached,  and,  since  it  is  supposed  that  transverse  fissures  are 
the  direct  result  of  high  wheel  pressure  acting  on  hard  steel,  a conv- 


10 


plete  investigation  should  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  scientifically 
determining  the  matter  and  ascertaining  a remedy.  Until  such  in- 
vestigation has  been  made,  danger  of  similar  accidents  will  exist. 

Out  of  the^gntgg^year’s  breakages  in  Minnesota,  viz., 
only  four  (4)  or^one-tenth  (1-1  Oth)  of  one  per  cent  (1  c/o)  of 
the  breakages  caused  derailments,  as  follows: 

a.  80-lb.  A.  S.  C.  E.  section,  derailed  (6)  freight  cars;  no 
casualties  resulted.  Rail  was  laid  in  1 908  on  a sharp  curve,  and 
had  a badly  worn  ball. 

b.  80-lb.  A.  S.  C.  E.  section,  derailed  three  (3)  loaded  freight 
cars,  no  casualties  resulted.  Rail  was  laid  in  1 908  on  straight  track 
and  was  very  badly  worn. 

c.  68-lb.  Special  section  (of  railway  company)  derailed  sev- 
eral freight  cars;  no  casualties  resulted.  Rail  was  laid  in  1891, 
and  was  much  worn. 

d.  36-lb.,  section  not  given,  derailed  one  engine  and  two  (2) 
coaches  of  passenger  train;  no  casualties  resulted.  Rail  was  laid 
in  1882,  and  was  much  worn. 

When  it  is  considered  that  the  four  breakages  just  described 
were  of  rails  badly  worn,  one  having  been  in  service  for  twenty- 
nine  years,  another  for  twenty  years,  it  is  not  at  all  remarkable  that 
the  same  should  have  been  broken.  It  is  also  to  be  noted  that  the 
four  resulting  derailments  were  not  the  instrument  of  a single  cas- 
ualty. 

From  an  examination  of  the  rail  failures  in  this  state,  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  broken  rails  are  not  the  cause  of  railroad  casual- 
ties to  the  extent  that  the  public  has  been  led  to  believe. 

It  is  also  found  from  a study  of  this  question  that,  as  a rule, 
the  train  responsible  for  breaking  the  rail  is  not  always  derailed, 
but  that  the  derailment  generally  falls  to  the  lot  of  some  following 
train.  This  peculiarity  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  a rail 
is  not  always  broken  clear  through  at  first.  It  may  be  broken, 
say  through  the  ball  or  base,  and  on  account  of  the  continual  ham- 
mering of  passing  wheels,  the  break  is  finally  carried  through  the 
entire  section.  That  there  are  no  more  casualties  due  to  broken 
rails  may  be  explained  by  the  vigilance  in  policing,  the  track  by 
the  track  forces  of  the  carriers;  the  electric  track  circuit  in  connec- 
tion with  automatic  block  signals  has  also  proved  itself  a valuable 
broken  rail  detector. 

As  the  largest  number  of  “broken  rails'  occur  during  the  three 
winter  months,  and  especially  during  the  periods  of  extremely  cold 
weather,  it  appears  that  railroad  travel  would  be  rendered  safer 


if  the  speed  of  the  heavy  passenger  trains  were  restricted  within 
moderate  limits  during  at  least  the  era  of  extreme  temperatures. 

On  the  railroads  in  Minnesota,  during  the  calendar  year  closed, 
Dec.  31,  1911,  154  accidents  occurred,  which  may  properly  be 
termed  “ railroad  wrecks.”  These  are  divided  into  two  classes, 
viz.,  casualty  and  non-casualty  wrecks.  Of  the  former,  there  were 
53,  and  of  the  latter  101,  which  division  assigns  practically  66 
per  cent  to  the  non-casualty  and  34  per  cent  to  the  casualty  class. 
A table  is  here  prepared  listing  the  above  described  wrecks  prop- 
erly classified  under  the  various  causes,  and  from  which  is  found 
that : 


RAILROAD  WRECKS  IN  MINNESOTA— YEAR  OF  1911 


Cause 

Non-Casualty 

Casualty 

Total 

Wrecks 

Casualties 

Frt. 

Trains 

Pass. 

Trains 

Frt. 

Trains 

Pass. 

Trains 

Employes 

Passengers 

Total 

Inj. 

I Killed 

Inj. 

| Killed 

Inj. 

Killed 

Broken  rails. . . . 

7 

1 

1 

9 

1 

20 

21 

Broken  switch 
points 

4 

1 

5 

1 

1 

Collisions 

12 

1 

! 18 

1 

38 

113 

8 

60 

8 

173 

16 

Defective  track 

24 

2 

26 

2 

2 



Failure  of  equip- 
ment   

37 

L ' 

3 1 12 

5 

57 

25 

4 

22 

47 

4 

2 

Failure  to  ob- 
serve signal . . 

5 

1 ! 

1 

2 

9 

3 

2 

6 I 

9 

Open  switch . . . 

4 

2 

1 

7 

1 

1 



Sun  kink 

I 

1 

1 

Track  tampered 
with . 

1 

1 

2 

2 

Wash-outs 

1 

1 

4 

4 

11 

1 

15 

5 

Totals  .... 

1 

94 

7 

35 

18  154 

152 

18  119  ! 

9 

271 

27 

The  above  accidents,  for  purposes  of  exemplification,  are  then 
re-classified  into  “ Preventable ” and  “Non- Preventable  Wrecks." 
“Preventable  Wrecks”  are  those  caused  by  collisions , defective 
track,  failure  to  observe  signal , open  switches  and  washouts , and 
which  are  directly  chargeable  to  human  fallibility  and  false  econ- 
omy on  the  part  of  the  company.  Under  “Non- Preventable 
Wrecks ” are  included  those  caused  by  broken  rails^  broken  switch 
points , failure  of  equipment , sun  kinks  and  track  tampered  with , 
the  responsibility  for  which  cannot  be  directly  placed.  The  two 
final  divisions  just  described,  when  properly  arranged  into  conven- 
ient tabulated  form,  disclose  the  following  results: 


12 


RAILROAD  WRECKS  IN  MINNESOTA— YEAR  OF  1911 


Class 

Number  I 

Casualties 

No. 

Injured 

[ 

No. 

Killed 

Preventable 

81 

200 

| 

23 

Non-pre  ventable 

73 

71 

1 , 

4 

Totals 

154 

271 

27 

It  follows  after  the  year’s  data  is  boiled  down  into  concrete 
from  that  the  preventable  wrecks  have  resulted  the  most  disas- 
trously to  life  and  limb,  also  that  of  all  of  the  five  causes  incor- 
porated  under  said  division,  collisions  are  responsible  for  by  far 
the  greatest  number  of  the  killed  and  injured,  i.  e.,  while  prevent- 
able "wrecks  produced  two  hundred  (200)  injuries  and  twenty- 
three  (23)  deaths,  collisions  were  the  source  of  one  hundred  sev- 
enty-three (173)  of  the  injuries,  and  sixteen  (16)  of  the  deaths, 
which  leaves  collisions  alone  accountable  for  about  eighty-five  per 
cent  (85%)  of  all  the  casualties  resulting  from  preventable  wrecks. 

Considerable  progress  has  been  made  in  late  years  by  the  de- 
velopment of  the  “ Manual  and  Automatic  Block  Signal  Systems ,” 
as  measures  tending  toward  preventing  collisions.  The  ideal  ap- 
parently has  not  yet  been  realized  thereby,  consequently  we  are 
led  to  believe  that  our  investigations  in  this  connection  might  prop- 
erly be  directed  to  the  question  of  the  possibility  of  obtaining  the 
advantages  assured  us  by  the  incorporation  of  the  very  best  safety 
systems. 

In  our  discussion  toward  removing  the  source  of  this  most  dis- 
graceful feature  of  “ American  railroad  practice ” we  should  exclude 
matters  not  pertinent  to  the  question,  such  as  comparison  of  the 
wreck-resisting  qualities  of  steel  and  wooden  cars,  and  the  policy 
frequently  indulged  in  by  some  of  the  carriers  in  going  to  the  ex- 
treme with  record-breaking  runs  in  an  effort  to  outdo  their  competi- 
tors in  an  attempt  to  obtain  what  appears  to  them  to  be  certain 
lucrative  business. 

While  the  exceptions  just  cited  are  far  removed  from  the  issue, 
they  may  be  profitably  discussed  in  their  proper  place;  these  dis- 
cussions, however,  will  not  be  of  any  help  in  checkmating  collisions, 
and  no  block  system  is  of  any  use,  or  value,  unless  it  furnishes 
ample  protection  for  all  trains  at  whatever  speed  they  may  be  run. 

Of  all  the  classes  of  railroad  wrecks,  collisions  appear  to  be 


13 


the  least  excusable  of  any.  From  a study  of  the  rules,  regulations 
and  other  safeguards  thrown  around  the  operation  of  trains  by  the 
carriers,  one  would  wonder  how  it  were  possible  for  a collision 
ever  to  occur,  if  strict  compliance  with  rules  be  rigidly  observed, 
but  as  previously  explained,  they  do  occur,  and  that  with  alto- 
gether too  great  regularity,  and  are  the  direct  source  of  most  of 
the  casualties  associated  with  railroad  accidents. 

You  ask  why  should  this  be  so?  What  is  the  use  of  drawing 
up  and  adopting  rules  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  life,  and  then 
not  complying  with  them?  What  is  the  occasion  for  this  non-ob- 
servance of  rules?  The  answer  is  human  fallibility , and  three  pri- 
mary reasons  may  be  given  for  this  ethical  weakness,  viz.,  disobe- 
dience, negligence  and  carelessness.  Having  found  the  funda- 
mental causes  of  preventable  wrecks,  what  is  to  be  done  to  remove 
them?  The  answer  is  apply  disciplinary  measures.  I desire  at  this 
point  to  quote  Mr.  Howard  Elliott,  president  of  the  Northern  Pa- 
cific Railway  Company,  in  an  address  before  the  Minneapolis  Pub- 
licity Club  a few  weeks  ago,  in  which  he  said  in  part: 

“We  hear  much  about  quasi-public  corporations,  and  public 
opinion  has  gone  a long  way  in  taking  away  from  the  owner  of 
public  service  corporations  the  right  to  manage  his  own  property, 
to  name  his  own  rates  or  prices,  to  decide  about  his  methods,  and 
has  imposed  on  him  the  responsibility  of  providing  safe  and  ade- 
quate public  service  from  his  private  means,  but  so  far  has  exerted 
little  influence  on  the  men  who  have  to  make  quasi-public  corpor- 
ations of  use  to  the  public.  If  a man  decides  to  work  for  a quasi- 
public corporation,  he  becomes  a quasi-public  servant,  and  he  has 
a moral  duty  and  responsibility  to  society,  just  as  much  as  the  own- 
er has,  to  see  that  society  is  not  deprived  of  the  service  necessary 
for  its  existence. 

“The  railroad  manager  is  hampered  in  obtaining  absolute  pre- 
cision and  reliability.  Over  many  of  the  employes  his  authority 
is  divided  with  the  labor  unions,  which  exercise  a powerful  influ- 
ence in  determining  the  extent  of  the  authority  he  is  to  exercise 
over  their  members.” 

If  the  conditions  claimed  by  Mr.  Elliott  obtain  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  to  hamper  the  management  of  the  company  in  controlling  its 
employes,  it  is  obvious  that  efficient  regulation  and  supervision  by 
the  state  can  only  be  secured  by  going  beyond  the  corporate  entity 
and  its  executive  officers,  and  making  each  individual  employe  strict- 
ly and  personally  responsible  for  the  proper  and  safe  performance 
of  his  individual  duties. 


14 


There  is  a marked  contrast  in  sensibility  to  duty  and  respon- 
sibility to  society,  between  the  railway  employes  of  this  country  and 
those  of  European  railways.  It  might  be  interesting  to  know  that 
there  are  less  fatalities  in  connection  with  the  operation  of  railways 
in  Germany,  than  with  the  agricultural  pursuits  of  that  country. 

Whenever  a railroad  wreck  entailing  loss  of  life  occurs  in 
that  country,  all  the  trainmen  and  any  others  who  are  in  any  way 
associated  therewith,  are  immediately  arrested  and  held  by  the 
state  until  such  a time  as  they  may  have  exonerated  themselves  of 
any  blame  in  connection  with  the  accident,  or  if  found  guilty  they 
are  punished  accordingly  by  the  state.  This  manner  of  dealing 
with  the  wreck  situation  undoubtedly  has  placed  Germany,  and 
other  European  countries  in  the  enviable  position  of  having  at- 
tained the  ideal  in  safe  railroad  operation. 

I firmly  believe  that  when  the  railroad  employes  in  our  country 
have  been  made  strictly  amenable  to  the  state  for  faithful  attend- 
ance to  and  performance  of  their  duties  that  an  important  step  will 
have  been  taken  forward  making  railroad  travel  reasonably  safe  and 
free  from  preventable  wrecks. 


15 


